Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 69

Issue 3

Article 7

2004

Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet International: Determining Whether
Fair Labor Standards Exemptions for Overtime Compensation
Apply to Fractional Ownership Programs
Kristen Bell

Recommended Citation
Kristen Bell, Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet International: Determining Whether Fair Labor Standards
Exemptions for Overtime Compensation Apply to Fractional Ownership Programs, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 605
(2004)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol69/iss3/7

This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For
more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

THIBODEAUX v. EXECUTIVE JET INTERNATIONAL:
DETERMINING WHETHER FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
EXEMPTIONS FOR OVERTIME COMPENSATION
APPLY TO FRACTIONAL OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
KRISTEN BELL

S INCE

THE INTRODUCTION of "Netjets" by Executive Jet
International ("EJI"), numerous companies have formed
fractional ownership programs.' As these programs grow more
and more popular, categorizing them has become the subject of
much legal debate. 2 Because these programs consist of a group
of owners and a managing company that services and operates
the aircraft, the legislature and courts have not had an easy time
determining whether these programs serve as public or private
entities. In Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet International,the Fifth Circuit oversimplifies this determination, utilizing an ill-suited standard to define EJI as a "common carrier. '
The "Netjets" program is EJI's largest source of business, comprising 98% of the company's operations from 1999 to 2001. 4
The program allows companies or individuals unable to justify
the expense of purchasing their own aircraft to have full access
to one by fractionally owning or leasing aircraft through EJI.5
The aircraft in the "Netjets" program are operated under Part
91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations ("FAR") and are thereEileen M. Gleimer, The Regulation of FractionalOwnership: Have the Wings of the
Future Been Clipped?, 67J. AIR L. & COM. 321, 323-28 (2002) (defining fractional
ownership programs as "multi-year programs covering a pool of aircraft, most of
which are owned by more than one party and all of which are placed in a dry
lease exchange pool ... available to any program participant...").
2 See, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1464-69
(Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Valdivieso v. Atlas Air, Inc., 305 F.3d 1283, 1286-87 (11th
Cir. 2002).
3 See 328 F.3d 742, 753 (5th Cir. 2003).
4 Id. at 745.
5 Id. at 745-46. EJI has a sister company, Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. ("EJA"),
that has programs similar to EJI, yet its employees opted to unionize. Therefore,
employee grievances are handled through the National Mediation Board. Id.
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fore not subject to the heightened safety and registration standards found in Part 135, the provision regulating commercial
aircraft.6

EJI does not own the aircraft it manages, but only operates
and maintains the aircraft fractionally-owned or leased by its customers and provides flight attendants upon request. 7 Larry Thibodeaux is a flight attendant for EJI's "Netjets" program.'
Thibodeaux and other flight attendants regularly work overtime
hours for the "Netjets" program, yet they are not compensated
for this time.9 Under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"),
overtime must be paid to employees unless the employer is a
"carrier by air subject to the provisions of IT] itle II of the Railway Labor Act." 10
In response to EJI's refusal to pay overtime compensation,
Thibodeaux and other flight attendants for the "Netjets" program filed suit against EJI, requesting payment of overtime compensation under the FLSA." Because neither the FLSA nor
Title II of the Railway Labor Act defines "common carrier," the
courts must determine whether a fractional ownership program
such as the "Netjets" program is a "common
carrier" for pur12
poses of the FLSA and Railway Labor Act.
The district court refused to find as a matter of law that EJI
13
was a "common carrier by air" under the FLSA exemptions.
The court further stated that even if EJI was found to be a common carrier by air, Thibodeaux and other flight attendants
would still be entitled to overtime because they spent over 20%
of their workweek performing "nonexempt" work, namely that
on Part 91 flights.' 4 Therefore, because such a small percentage
of EJI's flights were conducted under the commercial provision
Id. at 745; see also Eileen M. Gleimer, When Less Can Be More: FractionalOwnership of Aircraft-The Wings of the Future, 64J. AIR L. & COM. 979, 1002-03 (1999)
("[U] nder Part 135 restrictions apply to the types of airports that can be used, the
use and hiring of flight crews, and the exterior and interior of the aircraft.").
7 Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 745.
8 Id. at 744.
6

9 Id.
10 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (3) (2004); see also Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 181.
11 Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 744.
12 Id. at 749. The issue of whether Thibodeaux engaged in "nonexempt" work
is not discussed here, because the court's holding was premised solely on the
court's finding that EJI was not a common carrier.
13 Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Int'l, No.Civ.A.00-3237, 2001 WL 699653 at *2,
3 (E.D. La. June 18, 2001).
14 [d.
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of the Federal Aviation Regulations, the court granted Thibodeaux overtime compensation without further inquiry.1"
After reviewing the district court's holding on interlocutory
appeal, three judges for the Fifth Circuit ruled to reverse the
finding of the district court and remand the case for entry of
summary judgment in favor of EJI. 16 The court disagreed with
the district court's sole reliance on EJI's operation under Part 91
of the FAR as conclusive in showing that EJI may be different
from EJA, which has already been identified as a "common carrier" by the National Mediation Board.1 7 Instead, the Fifth Circuit gave little or no weight to the FAR, relying solely on the
holding in Woolsey v. National TransportationBoard to reach a different conclusion. The court found that no fact question existed regarding EJI's status and the company was a "common
carrier" as a matter of law.1 "
In Woolsey, the Fifth Circuit was faced with the question of
whether it should revoke the license of a pilot who provided air
support services to musicians when he failed to "comply with the
safety reguirements for pilots operating aircraft for a common
carrier under Part 135" of the FAR. 9 The court determined
that Woolsey's company, Prestige Touring, Inc., was a "common
carrier" because it indiscriminately solicited those in the music
industry to contract for its air support services. 2' To decide
whether the more stringent standards of Part 135 should apply
to Woolsey's carrier services, the court adopted an earlier definition offered by the Advisory Circular of the FAA. 2 1 Using the
circular's language, the court determined that Prestige Touring,
Inc., "held itself out to the public or to a definable segment of the
22
public as being willing to transport for hire, indiscriminately.
Therefore, Prestige Touring, Inc. was a "common carrier" under
Id.
See Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 754-55.
17 Id. at 754.
18 Id. at 749-50; see Woolsey v. Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., 993 F.2d 516, 523 (5th
Cir. 1993).
19 Woolsey, 993 F.2d at 518. According to the record, Woolsey violated § 91.13
of the FAR by acting as pilot even when he failed to meet the training and examination requirements under FAR Part 135. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 523.
22 Id. at 522-23. To reach this conclusion, the court explains that the underlying policy behind the Part 91 and Part 135 distinction is the public's "right to
expect that airlines which solicit their business operate under the most searching
tests of safety." Id. at 522.
15
16
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the FAR. 23 Furthermore, the court held that this test was "objective," looking at what the carrier actually did and not how it intended to be defined.2 4
In Thibodeaux, the court used the same definition to determine whether EJI should be defined as a "common carrier"
under the language of the FLSA and Railway Labor Act. 25 Using
the objective language in Woolsey, the Fifth Circuit refused to
take into account EjI's attempt to align itself with the provisions
of Part 91 and concluded that the inquiry involved in defining a
"common carrier" should be whether "EJI held itself out to the
public as being willing to transport for hire. '26 Because
"Netjets" marketed to a definable segment of the public through
direct mails, the internet, periodical advertisements, and attendance at public events, the Fifth Circuit determined that EJI held
itself out to a segment of the public indiscriminately and was a
common carrier as a matter of law entitled to the Railway Labor
27
Act exemption for overtime pay.
A close look at the decisions of the district and appellate
courts reveals that although each comes to a different conclusion, the foundation for their decision is based on the same legal principle-the distinction made between Part 91 and Part
135 in the FAR-that of "common carrier" status. 28 The Woolsey
test was initially created and utilized by the court to help determine whether a party was a "common carrier" and subject to
Part 135 of the FAR. 29 In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Thibodeaux recognizes that "common carriers," or commercial carriage, are generally "subject to the more stringent safety
standards of FAR Part 135. 30° Despite the court's strong statements against reliance on the FAR, the connection between
Id. at 522-23.
Id. at 523.
25 Thibodeaux v. Executive Jet Int'l, 328 F.3d 742, 750 (5th Cir. 2003).
26 Id.; see also Valdivieso v. Atlas Air, Inc., 305 F.3d at 1283, 1286 (11th Cir.
2002) (utilizing the same test to determine that a commercial air carrier who
owned and managed aircraft for transporting cargo was a "common carrier"
under the FLSA exemption).
27 Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 752-53.
28 Id. at 749-50; see also Woolsey, 993 F.2d at 521-23.
29 Thibodeaux, 323 F.3d at 749-50. It should be noted that neither Thibodeaux
nor EJI felt Woolsey was applicable to their case. Despite their arguments, the
Fifth Circuit chose to use the Woolsey test as the standard for determining whether
EJI was a common carrier. Id.
30 Id. at 750.
23
24
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"common carrier" for the purpose of determining FLSA exemption and of setting safety regulations is clear and determinative.
Arguably, the Woolsey test should not be applied here to determine whether EJI is a "common carrier" under the FLSA. In
1999, the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") conducted
an investigation to determine whether fractional ownership programs such as "Netjets" should be placed under more stringent
standards than those outlined in Part 91 of the FAR. 1 The FAA
concluded that flights operated under EJI in the "Netjets" program are more similar to owners of whole aircrafts than charter
carriers.12 Because fractional ownership programs are more
closely compared with non-commercial entities, they should remain under Part 91 of the FAR regulations.3" The Fifth Circuit,
however, buttressed its finding for EJI in Thibodeaux by using
precedent which comes to an opposite conclusion, that there
were "negligible differences" between "Netjets" and a commercial air charter business.3 4 Without explanation, the Fifth Circuit refused to consider the FAA's proposal in regard to
fractional ownership programs.3 5 Instead, the court chose to
adopt the definition of "common carrier" supported by the Federal Circuit for the payment of taxes, not the FAR provisions
concerned with the well-being of the public. 6
After this decision, EJI now wears two faces: it is a "common
carrier" under the FLSA but not a "common carrier" under the
FAA's current and proposed regulations. This dichotomy will
allow EJI to benefit financially from lower safety and registration
standards under Part 91,3 7 and yet be exempt from paying its
employees overtime, even those that work exclusively under Part
91 of the FAR.38
31 Regulation of Fractional Aircraft Ownership Program and On-Demand Operations, 66 Fed. Reg. 37,520, 37,521 (proposedJuly 18, 2001) (to be codified at
14 C.F.R. pts. 13, 61, 91, 119, 125, 135, and 142).
32 Gleimer, supra note 1, at 339-40.
33 Id. at 341 (recognizing that the FAA has proposed a new subpart to Part 91
to increase the standards for these programs but refused to move them under the
Part 135 regulations).
34 Thibodeaux, 323 F.3d at 751 (citing Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United
States, 125 F.3d 1463, 1468-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997), a case in which the Federal Circuit concluded that EJA was in the business of transporting persons for hire and
required EJA to pay transportation taxes as a commercial carrier).
35 Id. at 748.
36 See id. at 751.
37 See Gleimer, supra note 1, at 340-42.
38 Thibodeaux, 323 F.3d at 753-54.
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An analysis of the language and policy of the Railway Labor
Act clearly shows there is little justification for a finding inconsistent with the FAA to deny protection for EJI's employees under
the FLSA. In 1934, Congress expanded the definition of "carrier" under the Railway Act for numerous reasons.3 9 According
to the Fifth Circuit in Thibodeaux, Congress sought to accomplish two goals: "'(1) to avoid the possibility that certain employees could interrupt commerce with a strike, and (2) to prevent a
carrier covered by the RLA from evading the purposes of the
Act by spinning off components of its operation into subsidiaries
or related companies.' "40 The Fifth Circuit correctly noted that
this expansion has been applied to management information
systems and catering companies that service commercial air carriers.4 1 EJI's "Netjets" program, as a mere provider of operational and management services for fractional aircraft owners, is
measurably different from these providers that service commercial airlines. Therefore, the stated purpose of the Railway Labor
Act, "to keep transportation moving, '4 2 is not likely to be furthered by including EJI as a "common carrier" under the FLSA.
Not only does the Fifth Circuit's ruling fail to further the Act's
policy, it creates an undesirable result by unnecessarily excluding employees from the protection of the FLSA provisions. It
may be argued that the FAR and the test for "common carrier"
3
under the FLSA and Railway Labor Act are not synonymous.1
Thibodeaux is an example, however, of the inconsistencies that
can occur when the relationship between these two regulations,
enforced to provide public transportation safely and efficiently, 44 is ignored. Not only is EJI's role in providing air service blurred, but the employees who work for EJI are left
45
without protection from unfair employment practices.
The Fifth Circuit has viewed the issue with too narrow a lens,
failing to reach a valid conclusion in light of the case's complexId. at 752.
Id. (quoting Verett v. SABRE Group, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1281 (N.D.
Okla. 1999)).
41 Id. at 752 (discussing Verrett, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1281-83, and Dist. 6, Int'l
Union of Indus. Serv., Transp. & Health Employees v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 139 F.
Supp. 2d 557, 560-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
42 Id. at 754.
43 See id. at 748-50.
44 Id. at 745; cf id. at 754.
45 Id. at 746. Because EJA's employees are unionized, EJA is protected through
the collective bargaining of its union officials. Id.
39

40
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ity. 46

Despite the findings of a thorough investigation from the
legislative and administrative powers of our government, which
found that fractional ownership programs should not be regulated under the "common carrier" provisions of the FAR,47 the
Fifth Circuit hastily concluded that EJI is a "common carrier"
based solely on its solicitation to a segment of the population
interested in owning a portion of an aircraft.4 8 Because EJI operates 98% of its flights under Part 91 of the FAR,4 9 and will
continue to do so under the proposed FAA guidelines,5 0 there
remains little evidence that the policy on which the Railway Labor Act exemption stands would be harmed by a finding for Thibodeaux in this case.
The district court, in refusing to grant summary judgment to
EJI, correctly recognized the importance of the FAR, which allows EJI to remain under Part 91, and acknowledged the need
for further inquiry into the nature of fractional ownership programs. 1 If the National Mediation Board, the organization with
primary jurisdiction over the Railway Labor Act, 52 determines
that EJI is a "common carrier," the Fifth Circuit may have a
more legitimate basis for its decision. If that occurs, however,
Thibodeaux will be protected through a standard grievance process, and the unfair result reached in the present case will be
diminished.
- See Thibodeaux, 2001 WL 699653, at *2-3; see also Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 750.
47 See Gleimer, supra note 1, at 340-41.
48 Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 753.
49 Id. at 745.
50

See Gleimer, supra note 1, at 340-41.

51 Thibodeaux, 2001 WL 699653, at *2-3.
52

Thibodeaux, 328 F.3d at 746.
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